De-identifying a public use microdata file from the Canadian national discharge abstract database by Emam, Khaled El et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
De-identifying a public use microdata file from
the Canadian national discharge abstract
database
Khaled El Emam
1,2*, David Paton
3, Fida Dankar
1 and Gunes Koru
4
Abstract
Background: The Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) collects hospital discharge abstract data (DAD)
from Canadian provinces and territories. There are many demands for the disclosure of this data for research and
analysis to inform policy making. To expedite the disclosure of data for some of these purposes, the construction
of a DAD public use microdata file (PUMF) was considered. Such purposes include: confirming some published
results, providing broader feedback to CIHI to improve data quality, training students and fellows, providing an
easily accessible data set for researchers to prepare for analyses on the full DAD data set, and serve as a large
health data set for computer scientists and statisticians to evaluate analysis and data mining techniques. The
objective of this study was to measure the probability of re-identification for records in a PUMF, and to de-identify
a national DAD PUMF consisting of 10% of records.
Methods: Plausible attacks on a PUMF were evaluated. Based on these attacks, the 2008-2009 national DAD was
de-identified. A new algorithm was developed to minimize the amount of suppression while maximizing the
precision of the data. The acceptable threshold for the probability of correct re-identification of a record was set at
between 0.04 and 0.05. Information loss was measured in terms of the extent of suppression and entropy.
Results: Two different PUMF files were produced, one with geographic information, and one with no geographic
information but more clinical information. At a threshold of 0.05, the maximum proportion of records with the
diagnosis code suppressed was 20%, but these suppressions represented only 8-9% of all values in the DAD. Our
suppression algorithm has less information loss than a more traditional approach to suppression. Smaller regions,
patients with longer stays, and age groups that are infrequently admitted to hospitals tend to be the ones with
the highest rates of suppression.
Conclusions: The strategies we used to maximize data utility and minimize information loss can result in a PUMF
that would be useful for the specific purposes noted earlier. However, to create a more detailed file with less
information loss suitable for more complex health services research, the risk would need to be mitigated by
requiring the data recipient to commit to a data sharing agreement.
Background
There are increasing pressures to make raw individual-
l e v e ld a t am o r er e a d i l ya v a i l able for research and policy
making purposes [1-5]. This should be pursued as there
are many benefits to doing so [1-15]. National statistical
agencies have responded to such demands by creating
public use microdata files (PUMFs) [16]. For instance,
PUMFs from census data and population surveys are
often created [17-22], and recently the Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services has started work on creating
5% PUMFs from claims databases (e.g., inpatient and
outpatient claims) [23,24].
Making data available as a PUMF entails disclosing
individual level data with minimal restrictions or condi-
tions on access. The ideal PUMF provides as much
detail as possible short of disclosing raw files where the
patients are readily identifiable [15]. * Correspondence: kelemam@uottawa.ca
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In the US, 48 states collect data on inpatients [25], and
26 states make their DADs available through the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) [26]. This
data can be purchased for the purposes of research or
other approved use. All purchasers must also sign a data
use agreement prohibiting the re-identification of indivi-
duals in the data set. The equivalent agency in Canada is
the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI),
which collects DAD data from hospitals across the coun-
try [27] and makes it available through an application
process, as well as performing its own analyses on the
data. Data disclosed by CIHI are somewhat de-identified
(it contains no direct identifiers), and are only provided
when there is a data sharing agreement [28].
Discharge abstract data has been used for a diverse set of
research and analysis purposes, including public safety and
injury surveillance and prevention, public health, disease
surveillance, public reporting for informed purchasing and
comparative reports, quality assessment and performance
improvement, and health services research [29].
CIHI was considering the creation of a public use
microdata file (PUMF) for the national DAD. The avail-
ability of a DAD PUMF would make it easier for the
research community to confirm some published results,
provide broader feedback to CIHI to improve data qual-
ity, can be a tool for training students and fellows,
provide an easily accessible data set for researchers to
prepare for analyses on the full DAD data set, and serve
as a large data set for computer scientists and statisticians
to evaluate analysis and data mining techniques. A PUMF
would be readily available with no application nor waiting
time, at no cost to the requestor, and it would not impose
an on-going burden on the organization in terms of pro-
cessing requests for data. It would complement the exist-
ing method of providing data through the regular data
application process.
Two primary concerns with the creation of a PUMF
were to ensure that the probability of re-identification of
the patients is acceptably low and that the disclosed
PUMF had sufficient utility to end-users.
The purpose of our study was to create a prototype
PUMF. The outcome of this analysis was intended to
inform the decision on whether to proceed with an actual
PUMF. A critical criterion for making that decision was
whether the resulting PUMF still had utility for end-users.
The contributions of this study are: (a) an analysis of
plausible re-identification attacks on a Canadian DAD
PUMF, (b) a set of new re-identification metrics were
developed for evaluating these attacks, (c) a new set of
strategies for maximizing data utility when de-identifying
data were formulated, (d) a new efficient algorithm for
the suppression of large data sets was developed, and (e)
we present the results evaluating the probability of re-
identification and the de-identification of a Canadian
national DAD PUMF.
Definitions
Here we provide some basic definitions that we use
throughout the paper, review related work for the de-
identification of individual-level data (also known as
microdata), and present metrics for evaluating informa-
tion loss due to de-identification.
Categories of Variables
It is useful to differentiate among the different types of
variables in a data set. The way the variables are handled
during the de-identification process will depend on how
they are categorized. We make a distinction among four
types of variables [30,31], and these are illustrated in
Table 1:
Directly Identifying variables
One or more direct identifiers can be used to uniquely
identify an individual, either by themselves or in combina-
tion with other readily available information. For example,
there are more than 200 people named “John Smith” in
Ontario, therefore the name by itself would not be directly
identifying, but in combination with the address it would
be directly identifying information. A telephone number is
not directly identifying by itself, but in combination with
the readily available White Pages it becomes so. Other
examples of directly identifying variables include email
address, health insurance card number, credit card num-
ber, and social insurance number. These numbers are
identifying because there exist public and/or private data-
bases that an adversary can plausibly get access to where
these numbers can lead directly, and uniquely, to an iden-
tity. For example, Table 1 shows the names and telephone
numbers of individuals. In that case the name and number
would be considered as identifying variables.
Indirectly identifying variables (quasi-identifiers)
The quasi-identifiers are the background knowledge vari-
ables about individuals in the DAD that an adversary can
use, individually or in combination, to probabilistically re-
identify a record. If an adversary does not have back-
ground knowledge of a variable then it cannot be a quasi-
identifier. The manner in which an adversary can obtain
such background knowledge will determine which attacks
on a data set are plausible. For example, the background
knowledge may be available because the adversary knows
a particular target individual in the disclosed data set, an
individual in the data set has a visible characteristic that is
also described in the data set, or the background knowl-
edge exists in a public or semi-pubic registry. Examples of
quasi-identifiers include sex, date of birth or age, locations
(such as postal codes, census geography, information
Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:53
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/53
Page 2 of 26about proximity to known or unique landmarks), language
spoken at home, ethnic origin, aboriginal identity, total
years of schooling, marital status, criminal history, total
income, visible minority status, activity difficulties/reduc-
tions, profession, event dates (such as admission, dis-
charge, procedure, death, specimen collection, visit/
encounter), codes (such as diagnosis codes, procedure
codes, and adverse event codes), country of birth, birth
weight, and birth plurality.
For example, Table 1 shows the patient sex and year
of birth (from which an age can be derived) as quasi-
identifiers.
Sensitive variables
These are the variables that are not really useful for
determining an individual’s identity but contain sensitive
health information about the individuals. Examples of
sensitive variables are laboratory test results and drug
dosage information. In Table 1 the lab test that was
ordered and the test results are the sensitive variables.
Other variables
Any variable in the data set which does not fall into one of
the above categories falls into this ‘catch all’ category. For
example, in Table 1 we see the variable PayDelay, which
indicates how long (in days) it took the insurer to pay the
provider. In general, this information is not considered
sensitive and would be quite difficult for an adversary to
use for re-identification attack purposes.
Sometimes a variable classified as a quasi-identifier in
one context is classified as a sensitive variable in another
context. This will depend on the assumptions made
about the adversary’s background knowledge, and these
assumptions will be situation dependent.
Individuals can be re-identified because of the directly
identifying variables and the quasi-identifiers. There are
no directly identifying variables in the proposed DAD
PUMF. Therefore, the critical question is which vari-
ables are quasi-identifiers. The specific quasi-identifiers
in the DAD are discussed below.
Table 1 Example data
IDENTIFYING VARIABLE QUASI-IDENTIFIERS SENSITIVE VARIABLES Other Variables
ID Name Telephone Number Sex Year of Birth Lab Test Lab Result PayDelay
1 John Smith (412) 688-5468 Male 1959 Albumin, Serum 4.8 37
2 Alan Smith (413) 822-5074 Male 1969 Creatine kinase 86 36
3 Alice Brown (416) 886-5314 Female 1955 Alkaline Phosphatase 66 52
4 Hercules Green (613) 763-5254 Male 1959 Bilirubin Negative 36
5 Alicia Freds (613) 586-6222 Female 1942 BUN/Creatinine Ratio 17 82
6 Gill Stringer (954) 699-5423 Female 1975 Calcium, Serum 9.2 34
7 Marie Kirkpatrick (416) 786-6212 Female 1966 Free Thyroxine Index 2.7 23
8 Leslie Hall (905) 668-6581 Female 1987 Globulin, Total 3.5 9
9 Douglas Henry (416) 423-5965 Male 1959 B-type natriuretic peptide 134.1 38
10 Fred Thompson (416) 421-7719 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 80 21
11 Joe Doe (705) 727-7808 Male 1968 Alanine aminotransferase 24 33
12 Lillian Barley (416) 695-4669 Female 1955 Cancer antigen 125 86 28
13 Deitmar Plank (416) 603-5526 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 327 37
14 Anderson Hoyt (905) 388-2851 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 82 16
15 Alexandra Knight (416) 539-4200 Female 1966 Creatinine 0.78 44
16 Helene Arnold (519) 631-0587 Female 1955 Triglycerides 147 59
17 Almond Zipf (519) 515-8500 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 73 20
18 Britney Goldman (613) 737-7870 Female 1956 Monocytes 12 34
19 Lisa Marie (902) 473-2383 Female 1956 HDL Cholesterol 68 141
20 William Cooper (905) 763-6852 Male 1978 Neutrophils 83 21
21 Kathy Last (705) 424-1266 Female 1966 Prothrombin Time 16.9 23
22 Deitmar Plank (519) 831-2330 Male 1967 Creatine kinase 68 16
23 Anderson Hoyt (705) 652-6215 Male 1971 White Blood Cell Count 13.0 151
24 Alexandra Knight (416) 813-5873 Female 1954 Hemoglobin 14.8 34
25 Helene Arnold (705) 663-1801 Female 1977 Lipase, Serum 37 27
26 Anderson Heft (416) 813-6498 Male 1944 Cholesterol, Total 147 18
27 Almond Zipf (617) 667-9540 Male 1965 Hematocrit 45.3 53
This hypothetical example table is used to illustrate a number of concepts that we use throughout the paper.
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All the records that share the same values on a set of
quasi-identifiers are called an equivalence class. For
example, consider the quasi-identifiers in Table 1, sex
and age. All the records in Table 1 about males born in
1967 are an equivalence class (these have an ID of 10, 13,
14, 17, and 22). Equivalence class sizes for a data concept
(such as age) potentially change during de-identification.
For example, there may be 5 records for males born in
1967. When the precision of age is reduced to a five year
interval, then there are 8 records for males born between
1965 and 1969 (these have an ID of 2, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17,
22, and 27). In general there is a trade off between the
level of detail provided for a data concept and the size of
the corresponding equivalence classes, with more detail
associated with smaller equivalence classes.
Types of Disclosure
There are two kinds of disclosure that are of concern:
identity disclosure and attribute disclosure [32,33]. The
f i r s ti sw h e na na d v e r s a r yc a na s s i g na ni d e n t i t yt oa
record in the PUMF. For example, if the adversary would
be able to determine that record number 3 belongs
to patient Alice Brown in Table 1 using only the quasi-
identifiers, then this is identity disclosure. The second
type of disclosure is when an adversary learns a sensitive
attribute about a patient in the database with a suffi-
ciently high probability without knowing which specific
record belongs to that patient [32,34]. For example, in
Table 1 all males born in 1967 had a creatine kinease lab
test. Assume that an adversary does not need to know
which record belongs to Almond Zipf (record ID 17).
S i n c eA l m o n di sm a l ea n dw a sb o r ni n1 9 6 7t h e nt h e
adversary will discover something new about him (that
he had a test often given to individuals showing symp-
toms of a heart attack). This is attribute disclosure.
Known re-identifications of personal information that
have actually occurred are identity disclosures, for
example: (a) reporters re-identified an individual’s
records from web search queries publicly posted by
AOL [35-37], (b) students re-identified individuals in
the Chicago homicide database by linking it with the
social security death index [38], (c) at least one indivi-
dual was believed to be re-identified by linking their
movie ratings in a publicly disclosed Netflix file to
another public movie ratings database [39], (d) the
insurance claims records of the governor of Massachu-
setts were re-identified by linking a claims database sold
by the state employees’ insurer with the voter registra-
tion list [31], (e) an expert witness re-identified most of
the records in a neuroblastoma registry [40,41], (f) a
national broadcaster matched the adverse drug event
database with public obituaries to re-identify a 26 year
old girl who died while taking a drug and did a
documentary on the drug afterwards [42], (g) an indivi-
dual in a prescriptions record database was re-identified
by a neighbour [43], and (h) the Department of Health
and Human Services in the US linked a large medical
database with a commercial database and re-identified a
number of individuals [44].
Therefore in the current analysis we only focused on
identity disclosure. This does not mean that attribute
disclosure is not important to consider (i.e., absence of
evidence does not mean evidence of absence). However,
in terms of focus, we address only identity disclosure in
the current study.
Disclosure Control for Microdata
Statistical and computational disclosure control methods
can be applied by a data custodian to protect against iden-
tity disclosure [45,46]. Disclosure control methods are
concerned with both microdata [30,47-53] and tabular
data [49,54-58]. The term “microdata” means individual-
level data. Tabular data may contain frequencies or aggre-
gate statistics (e.g., means and standard deviations) in the
table’s cells. Given that the DAD PUMF is a microdata
disclosure, we are only concerned with methods for the
de-identification of microdata.
De-identification methods for microdata can be broadly
categorized as perturbative and non-perturbative [59]. The
perturbative methods distort the truthfulness of the
records in a data set. However, perturbation can be per-
formed by preserving the aggregated properties of the
data. Many perturbation methods have been explored, and
some of these are summarized below.
Random noise can be added to continuous data without
changing the correlation structure of the original data
[60-63]. Gaussian noise is frequently used for this pur-
pose. However, there are circumstances where noise can
be filtered out of the data to recover the original informa-
tion [64]. Another approach for both continuous and
categorical data is to apply perturbations by considering
the underlying probability distribution [ 6 5 ] :f i r s t ,t h e
underlying distribution is discovered, then distorted ser-
ies are produced and the original series are replaced with
the distorted series. Microaggregation [66-71] can be
another alternative for perturbation, which creates small
clusters of data and uses an aggregated value (e.g., aver-
age or median) instead of actual values. Some guidance
exists on the appropriate size of these clusters [69]. Re-
sampling [72] is a random perturbation method which
resamples individual values in the data set [59]. Another
approach is lossy compression which treats the continu-
ous data as an image and applies a compression such as
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group 2001) [73,74].
Multiple imputation utilizes techniques developed to
deal with missing data [75]. For example, for each contin-
uous variable, a randomized regression can be used to
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another perturbative method which provides unlimited
and correct interval answers to database queries without
revealing original values [77]. The Post-Randomization
Method (PRAM) is a probabilistic method used for cate-
gorical data [78]. A Markov matrix is used to change the
scores assigned to categorical variables based on pre-
viously determined probabilities. PRAM can be thought
of as a general approach comprising other techniques
such as adding noise, suppressing data, and recoding
data. Rank swapping is perturbation method which swaps
the values of a variable within a specified range of ranks.
It can be applied to ordinal or numerical variables.
Rounding methods perturb by rounding values to a value
in a determined rounding set [49].
The non-perturbative techniques preserve the truthful-
ness of data. Subsampling techniques only publish a
subset of the records in a data set [79]. This can be
more useful for categorical data compared to numerical
data because if an adversary performs a matching attack
using an external data set, continuous values are more
l i k e l yt ob eu n i q u e .Global recoding is a non-perturba-
tive technique that applies to all records in a data set.
Continuous variables can be grouped into discretized
values representing bins; for categorical variables, the
variable values can be grouped into larger categories. In
certain cases, top or bottom values of a variable can be
grouped and published as one value known as top/bot-
tom recoding, respectively. The statistical disclosure tool
mu-argus can apply global recoding [80]. Suppression
can be also used to either eliminate some values that
cannot be published (e.g., stigmatized diseases) or out-
lier values that increase the re-identification probability.
The k-Anonymity Criterion
A popular de-identification criterion is k-anonymity
[81-86]. With k-anonymity an original data set contain-
ing personal health information can be transformed to
protect against identity disclosure. A k-anonymized data
set has the property that each record is similar to at least
another k-1 other records on the quasi-identifiers. For
example, if k = 5 and the quasi-identifiers are age and
sex, then a k-anonymized data set has at least 5 records
for each value combination of age and gender.
Various methods can be used to satisfy the k-anonym-
ity criterion. For example, some authors have used
micro-aggregation [52]. However, when dealing with
health data, non-perturbative methods are favoured
because they preserve the truthfulness of data [87].
Furthermore, some of the most common implementa-
tions of k-anonymity use non-perturbative techniques
such as global recoding and suppression [81-86]. The
data analysts we consulted with were more comfortable
with global recoding and suppression because their
impact on data analysis was clearer to them. This is an
important factor because we wanted to ensure the
acceptability of the PUMF among data analysts. For this
reason, our study uses global recoding, a form of general-
ization, and suppression.
After the quasi-identifiers are generalized the equiva-
lence class sizes would be computed. For any equiva-
lence class that is smaller than k, suppression is applied.
Therefore, generalization by itself will not achieve k-
anonymity, and suppression is only applied to the small
equivalence classes.
Measuring Information Loss
During de-identification, the other side of the coin is data
utility. A trade-off exists between privacy and utility. If an
optimal trade-off can be found, patient privacy can be pre-
served while data users are satisfied with the data utility.
The data utility can be measured by information loss
metrics. Typically, lower levels of information loss are
associated with higher data utility, and vice versa.
The extent of suppression performed to the data is an
important indicator of information loss. Although the
extent of suppression has known disadvantages as an
information loss metric [87], it provides an intuitive way
for an expert data analyst to gauge data quality. The more
suppressed records and/or individual values in a data set
the greater the potential biases introduced in an analysis
of the data.
A reasonable quantitative assessment of information
loss could be based on comparing the analysis results
obtained from the original and disclosed (de-identified)
data [88]. However, this is difficult to achieve because the
potential uses of data can vary and it is difficult to predict
all of them in advance. In the case of the DAD PUMF it
is not possible to know with precision a priori all the
ways that data recipients can analyze that data, which can
include statistical as well as machine learning methods.
In fact, one purpose of creating a PUMF is to encourage
the development of novel data modeling and data mining
techniques.
Despite the lack of universally acceptable information
loss criteria or metrics, it has been argued that there is
little information loss if a data set is valid and interesting
[89]. A de-identified data set is considered valid if it pre-
serves (i) means and co-variances in a small subset of
records, (ii) marginal values in a few tabulations of the
data, and (iii) at least one distributional characteristic. A
data set is called interesting, if six variables on important
subsets of records can be validly analyzed. While a useful
starting point, this definition can only be meaningfully
operationalized if there is some knowledge of the analysis
that will be performed on the de-identified data. Another
suggested approach is to examine the function that maps
original records to the protected records [88]. As this
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tion loss will decrease, and vice versa.
Information loss metrics for continuous data include
comparing the original and de-identified data sets on
the mean square error, mean absolute error, and mean
variation [59,90]. Such metrics cannot be easily com-
puted for categorical variables; therefore, three methods
are suggested [59,88]: (i) direct comparisons based on a
distance definition using category ranges, (ii) compari-
son of contingency tables, and (iii) entropy-based
measures.
An entropy [91,92] metric was used in a number of stu-
dies to measure information loss [49,93,94] where sup-
pression, global recoding, and PRAM were used. Recently,
the entropy metrics described in [49,93] were extended to
deal with the non-uniform distributions, and the resulting
measure has been called non-uniform entropy [95] and
has been used specifically in k-anonymity algorithms [96].
Samarati used height as an information loss metric
[81]. Height indicates the generalization level in a quasi-
identifier generalization hierarchy. Greater height means
more information loss. Height is considered a weaker
metric compared to non-uniform entropy because it
does not take into account the information loss contrib-
uted by individual variables [87].
Another information loss metric based on the general-
ization hierarchy is Precision or Prec [83,97]. For every
variable, the ratio of the number of generalization steps
applied to the total number of possible generalization
steps (total height of the generalization hierarchy) gives
the amount of information loss for that particular vari-
able. Overall, Prec information loss is the average of the
Prec values across all quasi-identifiers in the data set.
A frequently used information loss metric is the Dis-
cernability Metric [98-105]. The discernability metric
(DM) assigns a penalty to every record that is propor-
tional to the number of records that are indistinguishable
from it. DM has been used often in the computational
disclosure control literature.
The minimal distortion (MD) metric measures the dis-
similarities between the original and de-identified records
[30,31,106]. This charges a unit of penalty to each gener-
alized or suppressed instance of a value. While both DM
and MD can assess the level of distortion, DM has an
advantage over MD in the sense that DM can differenti-
ate how much indistinguishability increased by going
from the original to de-identified data set [107].
Information loss caused by generalizations can also
measured by using the ILoss metric [108]. This metric
captures the fraction of domain values generalized to a
certain value [45]. ILoss for a record is calculated by find-
ing the sum of the ILoss values over all variable values.
Different weights can be applied to different variables
while obtaining this sum. Similarly, the overall ILoss for a
data set can be obtained by adding up the ILoss values
found for the records.
Iyengar [109] used a classification metric, CM, which
assigns a penalty to a record if suppressions or generali-
zations assigns the record to a different majority class.
This metric is applied to the training set and requires a
classification method to be used. The associated problem
is that the exact classification approach needed may not
be known at the time of data publishing. Fung et al.
[110,111] used a metric called IGPL to measure a trade-
off between information gain (IG)a n dp r i v a c yl o s s( PL).
IGPL is obtained by dividing IG by PL incremented by 1.
The formulas for IG and PL can be seen in [45].
Methods
In this section we explain how the Canadian DAD
PUMF was de-identified and describe the evaluations
that were performed on it.
PUMF Specifications
Our analysis used the 2008-2009 DAD. Only acute care
inpatient cases were included. The DAD excluded hospi-
talizations in Quebec. Cases with diagnoses or interven-
tions that indicated abortion or HIV were excluded.
These were removed because they represent higly stigma-
tized conditions where re-identification would cause sig-
nificant harm to the affected individuals. Therefore, the
only acceptable re-identification probability was zero.
The resulting file had 2,375,331 records. In this section
we provide the parameters for the PUMF.
Quasi-identifiers
The quasi-identifiers that were included in our analysis
are summarized in Table 2. The different levels of preci-
sion, or the generalization hierarchy, for each variable are
also included in the table. Diagnosis and intervention
code details are provided in Additional file 1. The gener-
alization hierarchy for diagnosis codes and intervention
codes is based on a standard hierarchical coding scheme.
The generalization hierarchies defined in Table 2 were
created in consultation with experts at the data custodian
who regularly perform analysis on discharge abstract
data. These experts considered the utility of the data
from the perspective of multiple data users. For example,
a PUMF that is useful for educational and training pur-
p o s e sa tac o l l e g eo ru n i v e r s i t yc o u r s em a yn o tb eu s e f u l
for a complex health services research study. Examples of
the types of end-uses considered were: education and
training of students and fellows, preparation of analysis
plans before making data access requests for the full
DAD, and evaluation data sets for computer scientists
and statisticians when developing new algorithms and
modeling techniques.
The generalizations in Table 2 represent meaningful
generalizations of the quasi-identifiers that would still
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tions were deemed not to be acceptable from the per-
spective of the data users. Intervals for the continuous
variables were chosen to be analytically meaningful.
The generalization hierarchies also represent policy deci-
sions made by the organization around the granularity of
information that they are willing to disclose. For example,
the disclosure of postal codes or patient location informa-
tion more specific than province was not acceptable to
CIHI.
Focus of PUMF
We evaluated two different types of PUMFs: (a) a geo-
graphic PUMF which contains the patients’ province but
reduced clinical quasi-identifiers (no length of hospital
stay information), and (b) a non-geographical clinical
PUMF where the lack of geographic detail would allow for
including length of stay. The two data sets that were cre-
ated are summarized in Table 3. Each PUMF represented
a different non-overlapping 10% random sample from the
population DAD data set and so would included approxi-
mately 240,000 records.
Characteristics of Adversaries
It is important to understand the characteristics of the
potential adversaries who can attempt to re-identify
individuals in the PUMF. This will help us determine the
plausibility of different attacks and direct us in choosing
appropriate metrics for measuring the probability of re-
identification. When making data available as a PUMF
one needs to make the worse case assumptions about the
adversary because it is difficult to predict who would
make a re-identification attempt. Consequently, we
assumed that the adversary has unlimited financial
resources and time, and is by definition not bound by
any data sharing agreements that would constrain his/her
behaviour.
Measuring the Probability of Re-identification
The primary metric we used to evaluate how likely it is for
an adversary to re-identify one or more individuals in the
PUMF is the probability of correct re-identification. This
is measured by 1/k within the context of the k-anonymity
criterion. We do not consider the probability of incorrect
re-identification in our evaluations. This is common prac-
tice, thus far, in the disclosure control community.
If the adversary matches, say, 1,000 records to a popu-
lation registry and is able to correctly re-identify only 50
records, a data custodian may consider that to be accep-
table. But there will be 950 records that were incorrectly
re-identified. Would this be acceptable?
Table 2 The Quasi-identifiers
Quasi-identifiers Coding #
Categories
PROV_XXX Province/region. Quebec data is not included in the DAD.
PROV_ALL The territories are grouped into one category + 9 provinces 10
PROV_REGION The country is divided into three regions (West, Central, and East), where Central consists of Ontario. 4
TOTAL_LOS_XXX Total Length of stay
TOTAL_LOS_DAYS Days up to 1 week, then in weeks up to 6 months, and top coded at 6 months + 31
TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS Weeks up to 6 months everything longer than that is top-coded into a single category 25
AGE_GROUP Five year intervals and top coded at 90 years 20
GENDER_CODE unchanged 5
1
MRDx
DIAG3
DIAG_BLOCK
DIAG_CHAPTER
Different levels of coding detail of the most responsible diagnosis code. 8967
1435
195
23
CMG_CODE These identify Case Mix Groups (CMGs), which are groups of patients with similar clinical and cost characteristics.
They are based on most responsible diagnosis (MRDx) and other diagnosis and intervention information.
545
CCI_CODE
SHORT_CCI
Different levels of coding detail of the principle intervention. Approximately 46% of the records had no
interventions.
8780
569
This table displays the quasi-identifiers that were being analyzed and the number of response categories. There are two versions of the province and total length
of stay fields as they represent different levels of detail.
1 Five gender codes are used in the DAD: F-female, M-male, O-other (trans-sexual or hermaphrodite, U-undifferentiated(stillbirths only), and Z-missing.
Table 3 The two PUMF data sets that would be created
ID PROV_XXX TOTAL_LOS_XXX AGE_GROUP GENDER_CODE MRDx CCI_CODE
1:
Geographic PUMF
XX X X X
2:
Clinical PUMF
XX X X X
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1,000 re-identified patients then one can argue that there
is no substantive injury to the 950 patients. If the adver-
sary was going to try to fraudulently use the health insur-
ance policies of the 1,000 patients or open financial
accounts in their names, there will still be no injury to the
950 patients (because the re-identified identities will not
match the actual identity information during the verifica-
tion process, and therefore these attempts will very likely
fail). Under such conditions we would not consider the
incorrect re-identifications as a problem.
On the other hand, if a reporter was going to expose a
person in the media based on incorrect information then
this could cause reputational harm to the patient. Or if
employment, insurance, or financial decisions were going
to be made based on the incorrectly re-identified data
then there could be social, psychological, or economic
harm to the individuals.
If we make the probability of incorrect re-identification
sufficiently high for the adversary, then we argue that this
would act as a deterrent to launching a re-identification
attack. This argument is based on two assumptions: (a)
an incorrect re-identification is detrimental to the adver-
sary’s objectives, and (b) information about the probabil-
ity of re-identification of individuals in the PUMF is
made public so that it is known to the adversary to influ-
ence the adversary’s behaviour.
Consequently in this paper we will only talk about the
probability of re-identification to mean the probability of
correct re-identification.
Probability of Re-identification Threshold
We need to define the probability of re-identification
threshold. This represents the maximum probability that
the custodian is willing to accept when disclosing the
PUMF [112]. Some broad guidelines have been developed
specifically for the creation of PUMFs within a Canadian
context [113], however these did not recommend any
specific thresholds.
There is considerable precedent for a probability thresh-
old of 0.2, which is often expressed in terms of a “cell size
of five” rule (or k = 5) [22,114-122]. However, this thresh-
old is more commonly used when data is disclosed to a
trusted entity, such as a researcher, rather than for disclos-
ing data to the public. It is also used when the data recipi-
ent will sign a data use/sharing agreement with the
custodian. In some cases a threshold as high as 0.33 is
used (a cell size of three) [123-126], although in practice
this would be under quite restrictive conditions.
In the US, the Safe Harbor standard in the HIPAA
Privacy Rule is sometimes used as a basis for the creation
of PUMFs since such data is no longer considered pro-
tected health information. It has been estimated that Safe
Harbor implies that 0.04% of the population is unique
(has k = 1) [127,128]. Another empirical re-identification
attack study evaluated the proportion of Safe Harbor
r e c o r d st h a tc a nb er e - i d e n t i f i e da n df o u n dt h a to n l y
0.01% can be correctly re-identified with certainty [44].
However, it can be argued that using a k value that is so
low would not be acceptable for a PUMF, especially with
the adversary profile that we described earlier.
In the current analysis we considered two probability
thresholds, 0.04 (i.e., k = 25) and 0.05 (i.e., k = 20). The
data custodian deemed these thresholds to be acceptable
to the organization.
Possible Re-identification Attacks
In order to reduce the re-identification probability of the
data set properly we had to understand the potential
attacks that an adversary may attempt. Assuming that
the adversary does not verify matches, there are three
possible attacks which will be described below.
The notation we use is illustrated in Figure 1. This
example shows a PUMF with 4 equivalence classes
sampled from the DAD population data set with 5
equivalence classes. Let the set of DAD population
equivalence classes be denoted by K and j Î K.L e tt h e
set of equivalence classes in the PUMF be denoted by J
where J ⊆ K,a n dfj is the size of an equivalence class j
in the PUMF and Fj is the size of an equivalence class
in the DAD population. Also note that fj ≥ 0a n dF j >0 .
In the example of Figure 1, the J set has four elements:
< 50, Male>, < 50, Female>, < 35, Male>, < 35, Female>.
Figure 1 Notation for equivalence classes. This example shows a
PUMF with 4 equivalence classes sampled from a population data
set with 5 equivalence classes. The PUMF set has four elements: [50,
Male], [50, Female], [35, Male], [35, Female]. The fj and Fj denote the
equivalence class sizes for the PUMF and DAD population data sets
respectively. Note that in this example f5 =0 .
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not know which individuals are in the PUMF. This is
reasonable since the PUMF would be a random sample
from the population DAD. Therefore, even if an adver-
sary knew that Alice was hospitalized in 2008, it would
n o tb ep o s s i b l et ok n o wi fs he was selected into the
PUMF. If the adversary knew who was in the PUMF
t h e nt h ep r o b a b i l i t yo fr e - i d e n t i f y i n gas i n g l ei n d i v i d u a l
would be 1/fj, which will typically be quite high for, say,
a 10% sampling fraction (since E(fj) =1×Fj). However,
given that the adversary would not know who is in the
PUMF, the actual probability of re-identification would
be smaller than 1/fj.
Attack 1: Adversary Matches a Single Patient to a Registry
In this attack, the adversary has access to a public popu-
lation registry containing identifying information and can
use that to match against the PUMF. For an equivalence
class that exists in both the PUMF and the population
registry, the adversary then selects a record at random
from either data set and matches it with a record in the
other data set.
Previous research has suggested that it is relatively easy to
construct population databases useful for re-identification
about certain sub-populations in Canada because of the
information available about them in public and semi-public
registries [129,130]. As illustrated in Additional file 2, it is
possible to create population registries for these specific
sub-populations: professionals such as doctors and lawyers
because their professional associations publish complete
membership lists, homeowners because the Land Registry
publicly maintains their names, and civil servants because
the government publishes lists of government employees.
These sub-populations are considered the at-risk members
of the Canadian population from a re-identification
perspective.
Re-identification under this attack could only occur if
the population registry overlaps with the PUMF (i.e., there
are individuals in both data sets). This is different from
the commonly cited US examples where voter registration
lists are available in many states [131]. In the US case a
disclosed data set is often represented as a sample from
the voter registration list and consequently the probability
of re-identification would be measured differently.
The quasi-identifiers in the PUMF that also exist in
publicly available population registries in Canada are
age, gender, and province. Therefore, the matching exer-
cise would be as shown in Figure 2.
Assuming there is an overlap between the individuals
in the PUMF and the individuals in the population reg-
istry, then the probability of re-identification for any
individual in equivalence class j in the PUMF is derived
in Additional file 3 to be 1/Cj where Cj is the size of the
equivalence class in the provincial population (measured
through the census, for example). We consider provin-
cial populations because that is the smallest geographic
granularity in the PUMF. In Additional file 3 we also
demonstrate the accuracy of this derivation using a ser-
ies of matching experiment simulations (for example,
see [132,133]).
T h em e a s u r ef o rt h eo v e r a l lP U M Fi st h ep r o p o r t i o n
of records that have a probability of re-identification
higher than a threshold:
1
Np

j∈J
Cj × I

1
Cj
>τ

(1)
Figure 2 Matching the PUMF against a population registry. This figure shows the process that would be used in by an attacker. The ID field
is only included here to make it easier to see which records are included in each data set. In reality there would be no consistent ID field
available across the data sets.
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indicator function returning one if the logical parameter
is true and zero otherwise, and τ is some maximum
acceptable probability threshold (as noted earlier, this
would be 0.04 or 0.05). The proportion in equation (1)
was computed for every province and territory separately.
To evaluate equation (1), we used the data from the
2001 census PUMF from Statistics Canada. Four popula-
tion subsets in the census matched our three at-risk
groups: homeowners, federal government employees,
healthcare professionals, and business professionals. For
each subset within each province we computed the num-
ber of (weighted) individuals within each age and sex
equivalence class that is smaller than the threshold. This
amounted to 11 provinces and territories (all territories
were grouped into a single category), four data subsets,
and two thresholds, which was equal to 88 different ana-
lyses. In none of these analyses was the proportion of a
province’s population with a re-identification probability
higher than 0.04 greater than 0.001.
Our results indicate that the proportion of the provincial
populations that have a probability of re-identification on
the quasi-identifiers that can be used for matching with
public registries is small and therefore the chances of a
successful re-identification using this attack is negligible.
Attack 2: Adversary Matches All Patients Against a Registry
In this attack the adversary also obtains a population regis-
try as in Figure 2, however he then matches all individuals
in the PUMF against the individuals in the registry. This is
different from the attack above which focuses on the prob-
ability of re-identification for a single randomly selected
individual.
Also, note that to launch this attack an adversary needs
to obtain or create a sufficiently large population registry
to have an overlap of individuals with the DAD PUMF.
This can be quite expensive and therefore there is a poten-
tial economic deterrent for this attack. To construct a
large population registry that is detailed enough can be
costly in practice. For instance, to create a complete popu-
lation registry with records containing names, home
addresses (including postal codes), gender and date of
birth for the 23,506 registered practicing physicians in
Ontario (a professional group) at the time of the study
would cost at least C$188,048. Similarly for the 18,728
registered lawyers, the cost is estimated to be at least C
$149,824 [129]. Although under our assumptions, an
unconstrained adversary could still spend that amount on
a re-identification attempt.
W i t hr e f e r e n c et oF i g u r e2 ,l e tt h ea d v e r s a r yh a v et h e
PUMF (data set D) and a registry (data set I). Let D and I
be two sets representing simple random samples of indi-
viduals from a population (say, represented by the cen-
sus). Note that D and I must have common records but
that I is not necessarily a subset of D or vice versa, in
other words, there is a possible overlap between the two
for any matching to be successful: D ∩ I ≠ ∅. Assume
that the set of population equivalence classes is denoted
by Q, and j Î Q.
In Additional file 3 we show that the proportion of
records in the PUMF that can be correctly linked using
an exact matching method with an overlapping registry
is at most given by:

j∈Q
fj
Cj
(2)
In Additional file 3 we also demonstrate the accuracy
of the derivation using a series of matching experiment
simulations (for example, see [132,133]). If we let a
represent the sampling fraction of D from the popula-
tion (census), then equation (2) can be re-written as:

j∈Q
αCj
Cj
= |Q|α (3)
As noted above, population registries in Canada only
include age, gender, and location information. There-
fore, the quasi-identifiers of relevance for this kind of
matching are: GENDER_CODE, AGE_GROUP, and
PROV_ALL.
In our data set we can compute the maximum value of
|Q|a s :2×2 0×1 0=4 0 0 .W eo n l yc o n s i d e rt w ov a l u e s
for GENDER_CODE because population registers do not
account for the other three gender categories in the
DAD. We can also compute a. According to Statistics
Canada, the population of Canada in 2008 (excluding
Quebec) was 25,573,800. Therefore a 10% sample from
the PUMF would mean that a = 0.009, and approxi-
mately 4 individuals in the PUMF would be expected to
be correctly re-identified according to equation (3).
Furthermore, the adversary would not know which 4
individuals out of the .24 million in the file were correctly
re-identified.
Given the low number of individuals that can be cor-
rectly re-identified and the adversary not knowing which
individuals were correctly re-identified, we consider the
chances that an adversary would try this attack, and suc-
ceed if attempted, to be negligible.
Attack 3: Adversary Targets a Specific Patient
Under this attack the adversary has background informa-
tion about a specific individual, say a 35 year old male
who is the adversary’s neighbour. The adversary does not
know if that target individual is in the PUMF. If the
adversary does find an equivalence class j that matches
the targeted individual, the adversary would then choose
one of the fj records in that equivalence class at random
as a match. The probability that the match is a correct
one is 1/Fj [134]. Therefore, to maintain the probability
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for all jthrough generalization and suppression, and to
maintain a probability of 0.05 we must ensure that Fj ≥
20 for all j.
This attack is plausible and represents the one that we
needed to focus on. Therefore, the remainder of the
paper describes how we created versions of a DAD
PUMF that protect against this attack through generali-
zation and suppression. Since we have the population
DAD, generalization and suppression were performed
on the full population DAD and the PUMF samples
drawn from that.
Strategies for Improving Data Utility
Level of Detail of Quasi-identifiers
Under attack number 3, our archetype adversary who
would attempt to re-identify records in the PUMF is a
neighbour. For any patient Alice, a neighbour would
know the basic demographics of Alice (GENDER_-
CODE, AGE_GROUP, and PROV_ALL). It is also very
p l a u s i b l et h a tA l i c ew o u l dt e l lh e rn e i g h b o u rw h ys h e
went to the hospital and what the primary interventions
were. Therefore, it is plausible that this kind of informa-
tion can be obtained by such an adversary.
Sometimes the adversary will know the full detail for a
quasi-identifier that can be hierarchically generalized.
Length of stay is such an example: a patient’s neighbour
can notice how many days the patient was in the hospital.
However, it is unlikely that an adversary would be able
to determine the full ICD-10 (International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems,
10
th Revision) [135] code for the most responsible diag-
nosis as these tend to be very specific and include some
clinical details that Alice herself may not know with such
s p e c i f i c i t y .S i m i l a r l y ,A l i c ew i l ll i k e l yo n l yp r o v i d eah i g h
level description of the intervention. The level of detail at
which an adversary would know the quasi-identifiers,
such as the diagnosis, can help us set limits on the
amount of generalization that needs to be performed.
Let us consider the diagnosis variable and the diagnosis
generalization hierarchy shown in Figure 3. This hierar-
chy has four levels. In this particular case the domain
generalization hierarchy is not totally ordered [82]
because multiple MRDx codes can generalize to a single
CMG_CODE, and a CMG_CODE can be specialized into
multiple possible MRDx codes.
If we assume that the adversary is not likely to know the
full ICD-10 code for MRDx of the patient, then it need
not be considered a quasi-identifier (at least for this adver-
sary) except insofar as it could be used to derive a more
general version of diagnosis that is known to the adversary
and therefore useful as a quasi-identifier. For instance, if
the adversary is likely to know the CMG_CODE for a
patient then we need to apply de-identification at that
level in the generalization hierarchy, and to all generaliza-
tions of CMG_CODE as well. In addition, it would be
necessary to ensure that suppressed CMG_CODE values
could not be derived from the MRDx codes; in general if a
CMG_CODE value was suppressed, the MRDx values that
generalize to the suppressed CMG_CODE value would
have to also be suppressed. Similarly, it would be necessary
to ensure that suppressed DIAG_BLOCK values could not
be derived from the MRDx codes and therefore the MRDx
values that generalize to a suppressed DIAG_BLOCK
value would have to be suppressed as well. We will refer
to this as a propagation of suppression from one quasi-
identifier to another.
Using the general rule set in Table 4 and our example,
we would suppress quasi-identifiers assuming level 2
knowledge (and its generalization to levels 3 and 4), and
propagate these suppressions to all values at level 1.
With this approach it may be possible to disclose
more detailed information and minimize suppression.
However, the assumptions about the level of detail of
the adversary’s knowledge, and so which levels in the
hierarchy need to be considered as quasi-identifiers,
must be defensible.
The general principle described here can be applied in
t h ec a s eo fs i m p l ed o m a i ng e n e r a l i z a t i o nh i e r a r c h i e s .
For example, the generalization hierarchy in panel (b) of
Figure 3 shows a diagnosis code hierarchy whereby each
MRDx value generalizes to a single DIAG3 value, where
DIAG3 consists of the first three characters of the
Figure 3 An example of a domain generalization hierarchy for
the diagnosis information. In this example we can see that at the
lowest level (level 1) this variable is disclosed with the most detail:
the actual ICD-10 most responsible diagnosis. This can be
generalized into the CMG_CODE (panel a), which is not a simple
generalization from MRDx, but also considers other information
about the acute admission (level 2). The MRDx value can also be
generalized to a three character code DIAG3 (panel b), which is a
direct generalization in the ICD-10 hierarchy. The diagnosis can be
further generalized to the ICD-10 block (level 3), and then the
chapter (level 4).
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common generalization hierarchy for diagnosis codes (as
depicted in panel b) can result in excessive suppression
[136]. Therefore in the current study we only consider
the generalization hierarchy in panel (a) of Figure 3.
Disclosing All Levels of the Hierarchy
To maximize utility to the user of the data, we can
include all levels of the quasi-identifier hierarchy in the
PUMF. In this manner the data user can select the level
of precision most suitable for their analysis and there is
no need to find a single optimal generalization for all
types of users.
We need to evaluate the probability of re-identification
and apply suppression for each level in the hierarchy
separately. Consider the example of the most responsible
diagnosis code. The adversary would have background
knowledge at a specific level, say MRDx. Then the adver-
sary can attempt re-identification using the combination
in 1a of Table 5 for the geographic PUMF. If the adver-
sary knew the most responsible diagnosis at a different
level, say CMG_CODE then s/he would attempt to re-
identify with the combination in 1b. The probability of
re-identification has to be measured four times. In the
case of 1a, only the demographic variables and MRDx
would be included in the measurement. Appropriate sup-
pression would then be performed on the demographics
and MRDx to ensure that the probability of re-identifica-
tion on these four quasi-identifiers is at or below the
threshold. If the adversary knew diagnosis at the
CMG_CODE level, then CMG_CODE is included with
the demographic quasi-identifiers, as in analysis 1b. Then
in analysis 1c, the demographics would be combined
with the DIAG_BLOCK, and suppression applied for the
equivalence classes that are too small. Once all of the
four cycles of suppression have been completed, all seven
variables can be included in the PUMF.
Using the scheme above, any combination of demo-
graphics and a diagnosis code will have a probability of re-
identification below the threshold. Therefore, we protect
against all possible levels of background knowledge that
the adversary may have. However, we make available the
very detailed diagnosis code information as well.
To implement this scheme effectively we needed to
develop an appropriate suppression algorithm. Consider
the example in Table 6, which assumes that we must
ensure that each equivalence class must be of size 2 (i.e.,
2-anonymity). Here all equivalence classes on the combi-
nation < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GENDER_CODE,
MRDx> are of size two and all equivalence classes on the
combination < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GENDER_-
CODE, CMG_CODE> are of size two. If we applied a sup-
pression algorithm on each of the two combinations of
quasi-identifiers there would be no suppression. This is
the best result because an adversary would try to re-iden-
tify using one of the two combinations. For example, if the
adversary had MRDx, then s/he would attack the data set
with the combination < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GEN-
DER_CODE, MRDx>. Even if the adversary had MRDx
and CMG_CODE s/he would still attack the data set with
the < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GENDER_CODE,
MRDx> combination because it will be the most specific
and have the smallest equivalence classes.
A heuristic algorithm for suppressing combinations is
described below. This algorithm iterates through all of
Table 4 Rules to use for constraining the search for the de-identification solution
Relationship between maximum acceptable
generalization (M) and adversary’s background
knowledge (Q)
Generalization level to
use for suppression
(S)
Generalization level to release data at
M ≥ Q(analysts could accept a generalization equal to
or less detailed than the adversary’s knowledge)
S = M (suppress at level
M)
Only include data generalized to level S = M
M <Q (analysts need a version that is more detailed
than the adversary’s knowledge)
S = Q The PUMF can have data at level M in the generalization
hierarchy, except when it generalizes to a suppressed value at
level S = Q.
The generalizations on the right-hand column can be applied to each quasi-identifier separately. The symbol M denotes the generalization hierarchy level
representing the highest generalization level acceptable for analysis. The symbol Q denotes the generalization hierarchy level representing the adversary’s
background knowledge, and S denotes the level at which the suppression should be performed. (In our example, M = 1, and Q = 2. Therefore, using this
example, the M <Q condition is met and we should: suppress at level Q; and include partially suppressed data at level M).
Table 5 The four sets of evaluations that would be performed at each level of the most responsible diagnosis code
Combination ID PROV_XXX AGE_GROUP GENDER_CODE MRDx CMG_CODE DIAG_
BLOCK
DIAG_
CHAPTER
1a XX X X
1b XX X X
1c XX X X
1d XX X X
For each value of diagnosis code there is a combination of quasi-identifiers that the adversary can use.
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method on each. In our example it would iterate
through < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GENDER_CODE,
MRDx> and < PROV_ALL, AGE_GROUP, GENDER_-
CODE, CMG_CODE> in turn and apply suppressions.
The basic principle of the scheme accounting for multi-
ple combinations of quasi-identifiers can be applied with
multiple quasi-identifiers whose levels will be disclosed.
Table 7 shows the results for when we have two hierarch-
ical quasi-identifiers and hence there are eight possible
combinations of background knowledge that an adver-
sary would have. In such a case the suppression algo-
rithm would iterate through the eight combinations.
For hierarchical quasi-identifiers where the hierarchy is
totally ordered, further combinations can be skipped. For
example in Table 5, the suppressions in DIAG_BLOCK
performed on combination 1c can just be propagated to
DIAG_CHAPTER without having to evaluate combina-
tion 1d.
Furthermore, this approach can be combined with the
earlier one (having all levels of detail for a quasi-identifier)
to minimize the amount of suppression. For example, if
we assume that the adversary would only have background
knowledge at the CMG_CODE level, then we would skip
the suppressions in 1a, and apply the same suppressions
on CMG_CODE from cycle 1b to the MRDx variable.
This would reduce the amount of suppression in MRDx
significantly.
For a more complete example, consider Table 8 which
shows that only two combinations would need to be con-
sidered if we assume that the adversary has knowledge at
the CMG_CODE level for diagnosis code and SHORT_-
CCI for the intervention variable. Then the suppressions
on CMG_CODE would have to be propagated to MRDx,
the suppressions on SHORT_CCI propagated to CCI_-
CODE, and the suppressions on DIAG_BLOCK propa-
gated to DIAG_CHAPTER.
Suppression Algorithm for Combinations
Current Approaches
We needed an algorithm that was suitable for suppres-
sing combinations. There are three general approaches
to suppression: casewise deletion, quasi-identifier
removal, and local cell suppression [137].
Casewise deletion removes the whole record from the
data set. This results in the most distortion to the data
because the sensitive variables are also removed even
though those do not contribute to an increase in the
probability of identity disclosure. Casewise deletion
would not apply to combinations of quasi-identifiers as it
would remove all of the record.
Quasi-identifier removal only removes the values on
the quasi-identifiers in the data set. This has the advan-
tage that all of the sensitive information is retained. How-
ever, it would not apply to combinations because all of
the quasi-identifiers would be removed.
Local cell suppression is an improvement over quasi-
identifier removal in that fewer values are suppressed.
Local cell suppression applies an optimization algorithm
to find the least number of values (“cells”)o nt h eq u a s i -
identifiers to suppress. All of the sensitive variables are
retained and in practice considerably fewer of the quasi-
identifier values are suppressed compared to casewise
and quasi-identifier deletion. We therefore consider algo-
rithms for local cell suppression that will ensure
k-anonymity.
One existing suppression algorithm has a 3k(1 + log2k)
approximation to k-anonymity with a O(n
2k) running
time [138], where n is the number of records in the data
set. Another had a 6k(1 + log m) approximation and O
(mn
2 + n
3) running time [138], where m is the number of
Table 6 Example of a data set with MRDx and
CMG_CODE
PROV_ALL AGE_GROUP GENDER_CODE MRDx CMG_CODE
ON [50-59] M B022 013
ON [50-59] M B022 033
ON [50-59] M C793 013
ON [50-59] M C793 033
Table 7 Example showing the eight combinations when we have two hierarchical quasi-identifiers where we disclose
all of their levels
Combination ID PROV_XXX AGE_GROUP GENDER_CODE MRDx CMG_CODE DIAG_BLOCK DIAG_CHAPTER CCI_CODE SHORT_CCI
2a XX X X X
2b XX X X X
2c XX X X X
2d XX X X X
2e XX X X X
2f XX X X X
2g XX X X X
2h XX X X X
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mation has been proposed [139] with polynomial running
time. Because of its good approximation, the latter algo-
rithm has been used in the past on health data sets
[87,140].
However, all of the above suppression algorithms
require the computation of a pairwise distance among all
pairs of records in a data set. This means n(n-1)/2 dis-
tances need to be computed because they require the
construction of a complete graph with n vertices and the
e d g e sa r ew e i g h t e db yad i s t a n c em e t r i c( t h en u m b e ro f
cells that differ between the two nodes). Such algorithms
can realistically only be used on relatively small data sets.
Furthermore, these algorithms do not account for
combinations and can only be used on all of the quasi-
identifiers in the data set at once. For example, if we
apply suppression on all of the five quasi-identifiers in
Table 6 we would have to suppress either all of the
values in MRDx or all of the values in CMG_CODE. By
considering the combinations seperately less suppression
would be necessary. Therefore, we need to use a sup-
pression algorithm which would determine the suppres-
sions required for each combination of quasi-identifiers
separately. Below we describe such an algorithm.
Combinations Suppression Algorithm
In this section we describe a heuristic algorithm for local
cell suppression when we have overlapping combinations
of quasi-identifiers. We assume that the data set has n
records and iÎ{1,...,n}. Let B be the set of quasi-identifier
combinations, and b Î B. Each combination has a fixed
number of quasi-identifiers denoted by the set Zb, and let
zb Î Zb (which means that zb is a quasi-identifier in that
particular combination). A single cell in the data set can
be indexed by V[i, zb] which indicates the record, the spe-
cific combination and quasi-identifiers in the combination.
The possible values for each quasi-identifier are repre-
sented by the set L[zb]. For example, if the quasi-identi-
fier is AGE_GROUP then it would have 20 possible 5
age intervals. Let l[zb]Î L[zb] be one of the quasi-identi-
fier values. The support of l[zb] is the number of records
that have that particular value: sup(l[zb]).
Individual quasi-identifiers may be assigned a weight.
Weights have values between zero and one. A quasi-
identifier with a higher weight would be affected less
during suppression because it would be considered a
more important variable. A weight is denoted by w[zb].
We then define the weighted support function as: wsup
(l[zb]) = sup(l[zb]) × w[zb].
Let E(l[zb]) be a function which returns a set of all
equivalence classes that have a value of l[zb]. If x Î E(l
[z]) then |x| is the size of the equivalence class.
The data custodian has set a risk threshold, τ,a n dk =⌈1/
τ⌉ represents the minimum equivalence class size needed to
ensure that the risk is equal to or greater than τ.L e tMb be
the number of equivalence classes smaller than k for a par-
ticular combination. These equivalence classes are called
moles.
The algorithm has two general phases. In the first
phase it removes all values in the quasi-identifiers that
have infrequent support (i.e., support less than k). The
reasoning is that these values by definition will always be
p r o b l e m a t i ca n dt h e r e f o r eh a v et ob er e m o v e d .I nt h e
second phase the algorithm iterates through each quasi-
identifier to remove the values with minimal support.
The algorithm is shown in Figure 4. It iterates through
the combinations (step 1.1). For each combination, it
determines which quasi-identifiers have values with
infrequent support (step 1.2). The values that have infre-
quent support are then suppressed (step 1.4).
Table 8 Example showing the two combinations when we have two hierarchical quasi-identifiers where we disclose all
of their levels but assume that the adversary would only have background knowledge at the CMG_CODE and
SHORT_CCI levels, and where one of the hierarchies is totally ordered
Combination ID PROV_XXX AGE_GROUP GENDER_CODE MRDx CMG_CODE DIAG_BLOCK DIAG_CHAPTER CCI_CODE SHORT_CCI
2f XX X X X
2g XX X X X
Figure 4 Pseudocode for the suppression algorithm.
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Page 14 of 26We then identify the combinations with moles (step
2.1). The quasi-identifier combinations with moles will
be ordered with combinations having the largest number
of moles first. The algorithm then iterates through these
combinations with moles in order (step 2.3). Within
each combination we find the value on any of the quasi-
identifiers that has the smallest weighted support (step
2.5). This value is then suppressed from all equivalence
classes that are smaller than k (steps 2.6 and 2.7). This
is repeated until there are no more moles in the combi-
nation, and then we proceed to the next combination.
Suppression Algorithm Walkthrough
We will illustrate how the suppression algorithm works
through a small example. To simplify the presentation
we will consider only one combination as exactly the
same steps would be repeated for each combination in
t h ed a t as e t .T h ee x a m p l ed a t as e tw ew i l lu s ei ss h o w n
in Figure 5. This has threee quasi-identifiers: sex, year of
birth grouped into ten year intervals, and the primary
diagnosis. We will assume that we are aiming for k =3
and the weight is one.
I nt h ef i r s tp h a s eo ft h ea l g o r i t h mw ei d e n t i f yt h e
values for the quasi-identifiers that have a support less
than k. For the sex quasi-identifier there are no sauch
values. For the year of birth variable two values have a
support less than three: 1940-1949 has a support of 2
(ID 5 and 26) and 1980-1989 has a support of 1 (ID 8).
T h e r e f o r et h e s et h r e ev a l u e s would be suppressed. The
d i a g n o s i sq u a s i - i d e n t i f i e ra sf o u rv a l u e st h a th a v ea
support of 1: COPD, sepsis, neurological problem, and
pneumonia. The final suppression after the first phase
of the algorithm is shown in Figure 6.
In the second phase of the algorithm five passes of
suppression are necessary, and these are labeled accord-
ingly in Figure 7. We start with the value having the
smallest support. A diagnosis of “cardiac condition” has
a support of 3. We then identify all equivalence classes
smaller than 3 that have this diagnosis. In this case
there are none. Similarly, there are no small equivalence
classes with a diagnosis of “arthropathy or spine disor-
der” or “gastrointestinal bleeding”.
The next smallest support is 4. A birth year in 1970-
1979 has a support of 4. All equivalence classes with
this year of birth are smaller than 3, and therefore this
value is suppressed from all the small equivalence
classes within which it appears. These are labeled by a
(1) in Figure 7. Next the diagnosis of “acute respiratory
problem” h a sas u p p o r to f4 ,a n di ta p p e a r si na n
equivalence class of size one (ID 8). That diagnosis
value is therefore suppressed within that equivalence
class and is labeled with a (2) in Figure 7. The other
equivalence class where this diagnosis appears has a size
of 3 (ID 16, 19, and 24), and therefore will not undergo
any suppression. A similar process is followed for the
other value with a support of 4: “external injury”.
We next consider a support of 6, which is a diagnosis
of “metabolic disorder”. There are two equivalence
classes of size 1 with this diagnosis, and therefore the
diagnosis is suppressed in these (ID 23 and 25).
The next support value is 9 for a year of birth in
1950-1959. All equivalence classes with this value are of
size 3, and therefore will not undergo any suppression.
The next support is 11 for the of birth of 1960-1969.
Here we have an equivalence class of size 2 (ID 10 and
14), in which case the year of birth will be suppressed.
At this point there are no longer any values on the
quasi-identifiers that are smaller than 3, and the algo-
rithm stops for this combination.
Computational Complexity of Suppression Algorithm
Our complexity analysis makes worse case assumptions,
and we assume that always k >1 .
For phase 1 of the algorithm we assume that all values
on all quasi-identifiers have low support. Computation
of this support can be done once for all combinations.
The computation of support requires a scan of all of the
records. Therefore, the initial computation of support
requires

 


b∈B
Zb

 
 × n operations. During that step we
would also keep index information about the records
with each support value. Und e raw o r s ec a s es c e n a r i o 
 ˜ Lb

  = n × |Zb| for all b Î B. This means that every value
in the data set is unique. Therefore it would be
Figure 5 Example data set for suppression algorithm
walkthrough.
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Page 15 of 26necessary to iterate that many times to perform suppres-
sions. The supressions would use the stored index
values to avoid performing additional scans, but would
still need to perform n suppressions. The total number
of computations for phase 1 would then be
3 ×

 


b∈B
Zb

 
 × n. This will be dominated by the n term
given that n  

 


b∈B
Zb

 
in practice.
For the second phase we would need to compute the
support for each value, but for this we would use the sup-
port values computed and updated during phase 1 of the
algorithm. However, we will still need to compute the
equivalence class sizes for each combination, which
requires|Zb| × n operations. In the worse case scenario we
would need to examine every value because it would have
low support, and suppress it in every equivalence class
because they would all be small. This would give a total
number of iterations equal to

zb∈Zb
|L[zb]|. If each quasi-
identifier has n possible values, then we would need
n × |Zb|iterations. At each iteration we need to update the
affected equivalence class counts requiring at most a total
of n computations. Also, at most we would perform
|Zb| × n suppressions in total. Therefore the total amount
of computation in phase 2 would be

b∈B
(3 × |Zb| × n + n)
assuming all combinations had moles.
In general, we would expect the amount of computa-
tion to increase at most linearly with the data set size.
Evaluation
Our empirical evaluation of the generated versions of
the PUMF and the methods used generate them con-
sisted of three components.
Measuring Information Loss
We assessed information loss using two parameters. The
first was the extent of suppression. As noted earlier,
suppression is an intuitive metric that data analysts can
easily comprehend while assessing data quality. Suppres-
sion can be measured as: (a) the percentage of records
that have some suppression in them (on the quasi-iden-
tifiers) due to the de-identification, or (b) as the percen-
tage of cells in the file that are suppressed.
The second information loss metric we used was non-
uniform entropy. Entropy was chosen because it has
many desirable properties compared to other proposed
information loss metrics in the literature. For example,
non-uniform entropy will always increase when a data
set is generalized and before suppression is applied
(monotonicity property) and will behave in expected
ways with data having an unbalanced distribution (see
the review in [87]). Because entropy has no easily inter-
pretable unit, we used one of the data sets as a baseline
and compared the other data sets to that as a percen-
tage increase in entropy.
Distribution of Missingness
The distribution of missingness due to suppression was
also evaluated. For the selected PUMF we evaluated
Figure 6 Suppressions after the first phase of the suppression
algorithm.
Figure 7 Suppressions after the second phase of the
suppression algorithm.
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Page 16 of 26whether diagnosis codes are more likely to be sup-
pressed based on age, region, and length of stay. For
example, if we take the province variable, equivalence
classes in Ontario will tend to be larger than in Prince
Edward Island (PEI). Therefore, the level of suppression
for the diagnosis codes in Ontario would likely be less.
A PUMF user may restrict his/her analysis to Ontario
only if there is too much diagnosis code suppression in
PEI. In such a case, knowledge of the distributions of
suppressions would be useful.
Performance of Suppression Algorithm
We evaluated the performance of our combinations sup-
pression algorithm, which will be termed the “combina-
tions” algorithm.. To help interpret its performance, we
compared it to an algorithm that does not take combina-
tions into account, which will be termed the “complete”
algorithm. The latter is the same algorithm as the former
except that there is only one combination consisting of all
of the quasi-identifiers.
The performance evaluation was conducted on a
Windows machine with a dual core Intel processor run-
ning at 2.6 GHz and 2GB of RAM. Both suppression
algorithms were implemented in the C# programming
language.
Three sets of performance evaluations were performed.
The first compared the overall algorithm performance in
seconds on each of the four data sets. The second com-
pared the overall time in seconds for each of the two
phases of the algorithms. We varied the value of k from 3
to 40. This allows us to determine whether the perfor-
mance of the algorithm is affected as the threshold for
acceptable re-identification probability changes. Both algo-
rithms are expected to perform more iterations as the
value of k increases.
The third evaluation was to assess how the algorithm
scales with the number of records in the data set. For each
of our data sets we created random sub-samples with sam-
pling fractions varying from 0.1 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1.
For each sub-sample we computed the time to perform
the suppression. The value of k was fixed at 5 for these
evaluations.
Results
Information Loss
In our analysis we assumed that the adversary would only
know the diagnosis code at the CMG_CODE level and not
at the MRDx level. Similarly, we assumed that the adver-
sary would only know the short version of the intervention
code rather than the detailed intervention code.
The number of records with suppression on each of the
quasi-identifiers for the geographic and clinical PUMF
files (extent of missingness) are shown. We present the
results at the alternate 0.04 and 0.05 probability threshold
levels as shown in Table 9 and Table 10. We also include
the 0.2 probability threshold as a baseline value for com-
parison (the 0.2 threshold is often used when there are
factors that mitigate the risk, such as data use agreements
with trusted agents).
Two versions of the geographic PUMF file were created,
one at each of the two levels of geography (PROV_ALL
and PROV_REGION). PROV_REGION treats the country
as consisting of three regions and the territories. Also, two
versions of the clinical PUMF file were created, one that
shows the individual days of LOS for the first week and
one that treats 1 to 7 total days of stay as a single category
(LOS_DAYS and LOS_WEEKS). This distinction is impor-
tant because the vast majority of stays are less than one
week. The multiple versions of the PUMF file allow us to
consider the impact of these alternative generalizations on
information loss.
The results for both suppression algorithms, combina-
tions and complete, are also shown in Table 9 and
Table 10. For each data set and threshold we show the
percentage of values within each quasi-identifier that are
suppressed, and the percentage of all cells across all
quasi-identifiers that are suppressed. The entropy as a
percentage change from a baseline (indicated by 100%)
is given for each column.
The missingness and entropy results indicate that: (a)
there is less missingness and less information loss with the
0.05 threshold than for the 0.04 threshold, (b) the combi-
nations suppression algorithm produces less information
loss overall than the complete suppression algorithm, and
(c) the PROV_REGION and TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS data
sets have less information loss overall. For the latter find-
ing, this reflects that the generalizations for the PROV_RE-
GION and TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS data sets were offset by
the significant reduction in suppression, giving them a
higher utility.
Based on these results, and to maintain data utility the
authors and CIHI decided to use the 0.05 threshold for
creating a PUMF, and use the PROV_ REGION and
TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS data sets with the combinations
suppression algorithm.
Distribution of Missingness
The second set of results show how the missingness is dis-
tributed in the data. We consider how missingness on the
diagnosis code variable distributed by province (Table 11),
age group (Table 12), and length of stay (Table 13) for
the PUMF files for the diagnosis variable. These results
are only presented here for the PROV_REGION and
TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS PUMF files at the 0.05 probability
threshold.
Performance of Suppression Algorithms
The first set of results are shown in Figure 8, which
show overall performance in seconds. This varies from
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data set. There are a number of trends that can be
observed:
￿ Because the PROV_ALL and TOTAL_LOS_DAYS
data sets have variables with more response categories,
they will take longer to suppress. This is expected
because that means they also have a larger number of
equivalence classes that the algorithm has to iterate
through and hence apply more suppression.
￿ The differences between the two algorithms tend to
be more marked at lower values of k, with the combi-
nations algorithm taking longer. This is due to the
complete algorithm reaching a solution quite fast at
low values.
￿ One would expect that the combinations algorithm
would take much more than the complete algorithm.
Such a difference would be in phase 2 as both algo-
rithms have the same phase 1. While there are dif-
ferences, they are not dramatic. This is explained by
the observation that earlier combinations result in
suppressions that reduce the number of necessary
iterations for subsequent combinations.
The trend is for less time at low k, then rising, and
eventually starting to fall again at the higher values of k.
Table 9 Main results for geographic file
PROV_ALL PROV_REGION
0.2 0.05 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.04
Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete
GENDER_CODE 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.012
AGE_GROUP 1.6 5.2 5.4 14.2 6.5 16.4 0.81 3.8 2.8 10.6 3.4 12.2
PROV_XXX 0.07 3.11 0.2 7.4 0.25 8.3 0.06 0.3 0.16 0.5 0.19 0.6
MRDx 12.6 14.4 26.8 27 29.4 29.4 8.6 10.7 19.4 21.4 21.6 23.5
CMG_CODE 12.6 14.4 26.8 27 29.4 29.4 8.6 10.7 19.4 21.4 21.6 23.5
DIAG_BLOCK 8.5 4.8 19.8 9.5 22.2 10.5 5.5 3.6 13.5 7.5 15.2 8.3
DIAG_CHAPTER 1.5 0.11 3.8 0.3 4.3 0.4 0.87 0.07 2.5 0.3 2.8 0.31
CCI_CODE 5.9 8.13 10.7 13.2 11.5 14.14 4.4 6.8 8.8 11.9 9.7 12.7
SHORT_CCI 5.9 8.13 10.7 13.2 11.5 14.14 4.4 6.8 8.8 11.9 9.7 12.7
Total % Cells
Suppressed
5.4 6.5 11.6 12.4 12.8 13.6 3.7 4.75 8.4 9.5 9.4 10.4
Entropy (%) 100 137 246 302 274 334 70 104 181 236 204 262
Missingness (as a percentage of all records) for different probability threshold levels and levels of geographic detail for the quasi-identifiers in the first PUMF for
combinations ("comb”) and complete algorithms. The last two rows show the percentage of cells in the quasi-identifiers that are suppressed and the entropy
change from the baseline as a percentage.
Table 10 Main results for clinical file
TOTAL_LOS_DAYS TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS
0.2 0.05 0.04 0.2 0.05 0.04
Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete Comb. Complete
GENDER_CODE 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.01 0.004 0.012
AGE_GROUP 2.5 6.2 7.6 16.7 8.86 19.2 1.32 3.7 4.2 9.8 4.8 11.25
TOTAL_LOS_XXX 1.2 6.8 1.8 12.3 1.9 13.3 1.2 4.7 1.8 7.08 1.9 7.4
MRDx 15.8 16.4 30.4 29 33 31.1 10.2 10.8 19.8 20 21.6 21.7
CMG_CODE 15.8 16.4 30.4 29 33 31.1 10.2 10.8 19.8 20 21.6 21.7
DIAG_BLOCK 11.4 5.4 24.2 10.2 27 11.1 6.96 3.5 15.1 6.8 16.5 7.5
DIAG_CHAPTER 2.22 0.14 5 0.28 5.6 0.34 1.4 0.066 3.3 0.16 3.7 0.19
CCI_CODE 7.4 9.16 12.3 14 13.2 14.8 4.9 6.7 8.9 11.22 9.6 12
SHORT_CCI 7.4 9.16 12.3 14 13.2 14.8 4.9 6.7 8.9 11.22 9.6 12
Total % Cells
Suppressed
7.08 7.74 13.77 13.94 15.1 15.1 4.6 5.2 9.1 9.6 9.92 10.4
Entropy (%) 100 123 201 237 219 259 50 68 114 143 126 158
Missingness (as a percentage of all records) for different probability threshold levels and levels of LOS detail for the quasi-identifiers in the second PUMF for
combinations ("comb”) and complete algorithms. The last two rows show the percentage of cells in the quasi-identifiers that are suppressed and the entropy
change from the baseline as a percentage.
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Page 18 of 26The explanation for the gradual reduction in computa-
tion time as k increases is that the suppression during
phase 1 of both algorithms has more impact for the
higher values of k, which results in fewer iterations for
phase 2. This pattern is evident in the graphs of Figure
9 and Figure 10, where the phase 1 time increases with
k reflecting more iterations, but phase 2 gradually
decreasing.
The graphs in Figure 9 and Figure 10 show that phase
2 of the algorithm takes considerably more time. This is
driven by the need to re-compute equivalence classes
and their sizes at each iteration. Whereas phase 1 only
considers individual quasi-identifiers.
For such large data sets the overall performance of the
combinations algorithm was deemed acceptable, espe-
cially that the increment in time costs compared to the
complete suppression algorithm was not significant.
Figure 11 shows how the performance changes as the
sampling fraction changes. In all cases the algorithms’
time performance scales linearly with larger data sets. In
general the gap in time between the combinations and
complete algorithms is minimal at small sampling frac-
tions, and widens as the sampling fraction increases.
Discussion
Summary
A substantial difference was found between the PRO-
V_ALL and PROV_REGION data sets, and the
TOTAL_LOS_DAYS and TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS data
sets. The more generalized data sets tended to have con-
siderably less information loss. Also, the clinical PUMF
tended to have more suppression than the geographic
PUMF because the LOS variable has more possible
values on it (see Table 2). Therefore, we recommended
using the PROV_REGION and TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS
data sets as the basis for a PUMF.
There is an advantage to using the combinations sup-
pression algorithm compared to the complete suppres-
sion algorithm. This is evident when we look at the
percentage of total cells suppressed for the two algo-
rithms and the difference in entropy.
Therefore, by using the 0.05 threshold, the more gen-
eralized versions of the two PUMF files, and the combi-
nations algorithm we are able to produce a data set with
significantly less information loss than would otherwise
be the case. For example, for the geographic PUMF
Table 11 The percentage of missingness on CMG_CODE
by region
Province CMG_CODE
(% Missing)
East (10.8%) 30.3
Central (45.5%) 19.1
West (43.2%) 16.6
Territories (0.3%) 53.0
The percentage in parentheses next to each region is its percentage of the
total file. The probability threshold level was 0.05.
Table 12 The percentage of missingness on CMG_CODE
by age group for each PUMF
CMG_CODE
(% Missing)
AGE_GROUP PUMF 1 PUMF 2
0-4 5.2 5.3
5-9 23 13.8
10-14 28.6 19
15-19 20.4 15.6
20-24 14.8 11
25-29 11.2 8.7
30-34 12 9.3
35-39 17.9 13.6
40-44 26 20.3
45-49 25.7 22.1
50-54 25.9 23
55-59 25.8 23.7
60-64 23.9 23.6
65-69 23.4 24.4
70-74 22.8 24.4
75-79 20.4 24.6
80-84 19.4 24.9
85-89 19.2 23.3
90+ 18 21.1
The probability threshold level was 0.05.
Table 13 The percentage of missingness on CMG_CODE
by total LOS in weeks for the second PUMF
TOTAL_LOS_WEEKS (days) CMG_CODE
(% Missing)
1-7 11
8-14 44
15-21 60
22-28 68
29-35 75
36-42 81
43-49 83
50-56 79
57-63 78
64-70 100
71-77 100
78-84 100
176+ 80
The probability threshold level was 0.05.
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Page 19 of 26using PROV_ALL at the 0.04 threshold with the com-
plete suppression algorithm results in 13.6% of the cells
being suppressed, whereas our recommended PUMF has
only 8.4% of its cells suppressed. For the second PUMF
the differences are 15.1% versus 9.1%. In both cases
there was a marked improvement in data utility as mea-
sured by the percentage of suppressed cells. Similarly,
the complete suppression PROV_ALL data set at the
0.04 threshold had a 334% entropy value, compared to
the combinations suppression PROV_REGION file with
a 0.05 threshold which had less than two thirds of the
entropy at 181%.
The variable with the most suppression was diagnosis
code, with just under 20% of the records having suppres-
sion there. The least generalized data set with the 0.04
threshold and the complete suppression algorithm results
in suppression closer to 30% on the diagnosis code
variable.
The smallest provinces tend to have the most suppres-
sion: the Eastern region and the territories. Similarly, age
groups that tend to have the most suppression are those
with the fewest hospital visits (e.g., 5-14 years), and the
age groups with the least suppression have the most hos-
pital visits (e.g., newborns and toddlers in the 0-4 years
age range). By far, the vast majority of stays are less than
7 days, and therefore this category has the least suppres-
sion. Longer stays are considerably less common, result-
ing in them having high levels of suppression.
Our combinations suppression algorithm results in
less information loss than an algorithm that does not
take combinations into account. It has acceptable per-
formance on this large data set for k values up to 40,
and scales linearly with the data set size.
Practical Implications
One important reason for sampling was to ensure that
the two PUMF files would not have the same individuals
in them, precluding the possibility of linking the two
files by an adversary. For example, using the same rea-
soning as in Additional file 3, any two independent
Figure 8 Time in seconds to perform the suppression using each of the two algorithms on the four resultant data sets as the k value
is changed.
Emam et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2011, 11:53
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/11/53
Page 20 of 26samples with replacement from the population will have
an expected number of records that can be matched
correctly equal to Ka where K is the number of equiva-
lence classes in the population and a is the sampling
fraction. If we have 100,000 equivalence classes in the
population and a 10% sampling fraction, then 10,000
records could be correctly matched on average. A higher
sampling fraction would mean more records could be
matched. In practice, an adversary would not know
which 10,000 records were matched correctly, however,
which may limit the meaningfulness of the matching
exercise. Nevertheless, to err on the conservative side
we wanted to ensure that the samples cannot overlap.
To contextualize our results with other disclosures of
health information in Canada, the Statistics Canada census
disclosure control process uses record level suppression,
therefore the census PUMF does not have suppressed
cells. It should also be noted that the census PUMF does
not include any variables that have as many response cate-
gories as the DAD (e.g., the census only includes
generalized occupation or industry codes with at most 25
possible categories, unlike diagnosis and intervention
codes which are much more detailed). Therefore, in one
sense it is not surprising that the amount of suppression
for the DAD PUMF under the current specifications
would be higher than we see in the census file. Further-
more, the Canadian census PUMF is still not generally
available to the public, but has some restrictions on its dis-
closure. Another study which performed a re-identification
risk assessment for a non-public disclosure of a pharmacy
file noted that suppression on some variables of as much
as 15% still provided utility to the end users [140]. This
number is comparable to ours when one considers that
the pharmacy file disclosure required a data sharing agree-
ment and regular audits of the data recipients.
Rather than drawing the PUMF data from the sup-
pressed population file, it may be better to remove the
records with suppression on many quasi-identifiers or
where key variables are suppressed, and then draw the
PUMF files from this new population. That way there will
Figure 9 Time to perform each of the phases of the combinations suppression algorithm for the four resultant data sets as the k
value is changed.
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Page 21 of 26be little or no cell suppression in the PUMF files. How-
ever, such a PUMF will be missing more records from
patients living in small areas, with longer stays, and with
rare diagnoses and interventions. It may be possible to
compensate for such missingness by providing weights for
the non-suppressed values.
Another approach to reduce missingness is to further
generalize diagnosis and intervention codes. It is quite
likely that further reductions in the number of categories
on these variables would reduce missingness. However, it
remains an empirical question whether additions of other
levels to the current domain generalization hierarchies
for these two variables will be meaningful.
T h eP U M Ft h a tw eh a v ed e s c r i b e dh e r em a yb eo fu t i -
lity for many specific purposes, such as making it easier
for the research community to confirm some published
results, providing broader feedback to CIHI to improve
data quality, training students and fellows, providing an
easily accessible data set for researchers to prepare for
analyses on the full DAD data set, and serving as a large
data set for computer scientists and statisticians to evalu-
ate analysis and data mining techniques. However, for
complex research analysis, more detailed information
would typically be needed than can be provided in a
PUMF. The most appropriate action may be to produce
an Analytical File that would be readily available to
researchers and other users who satisfy some significant
conditions regarding access and use of the data, including
signing and being legally bound by data sharing agree-
ments. Such a file would still need to have records with a
low probability of re-identification, although the thresh-
old used would likely be set higher, say 0.2, leading to
reduced suppression and therefore greater utility of the
released data. As noted earlier, higher thresholds are sui-
table when the data is being disclosed to trusted parties.
Data sharing agreements establish the trust and so miti-
gate the risks from the higher threshold. The use of data
sharing agreements is the approach used by the AHRQ
in the US when disclosing state discharge abstract data
for secondary purposes.
Figure 10 Time to perform each of the phases of the complete suppression algorithm for the four resultant data sets as the k value
is changed.
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The analysis presented here does not address protection
against attribute disclosure. In a final PUMF that would
be released to the public, protections against attribute
disclosure would normally need to be implemented as
an added precaution.
Conclusions
The public availability of detailed hospital discharge
abstract data could benefit many communities, including
health and data analysis researchers, educators, students,
as well as the data custodians themselves. However, the
public disclosure of health information can only be done if
it is credibly de-identified. In this paper we have described
how Canadian discharge abstract data can be de-identified,
and clarified the costs in terms of data quality of doing so.
Our de-identification utilized new metrics, methods and
algorithms to maximize the utility of the data and to pro-
vide strong privacy guarantees. Furthermore, the process
we followed highlighted the tradeoffs that need to be con-
sidered by a data custodian when making data available.
But challenges remain for the disclosure of detailed health
information, for example, the generalization of diagnosis
codes to reduce the number of unique codes but retaining
sufficient detail is an area for future work.
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